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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JACK BIAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature Of The Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40930 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state requests review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' November 6, 2014 
opinion in which the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order denying Bias' 
motion for substitute counsel to pursue a post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. State v. Bias, Docket No. 40930, 2014 Opinion No. 94 (Idaho App., Nov. 6, 2014) 
(hereinafter "Opinion"). The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order based on 
its determinations that Bias had a statutory right to conflict-free counsel to pursue his 
post-judgment motions; that the statutory right imposed upon the district court the same 
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affirmative duty to inquire into the basis for Bias' request for substitute counsel as would 
be required under the Sixth Amendment; and that the district court failed to conduct an 
adequate inquiry before ruling on the motion. Review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion 
is appropriate because the reasoning and holdings therein are contrary to both this 
Court's precedent and prior Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent regarding the scope of 
the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. For the Court's convenience, a 
copy of the Court of Appeals' Opinion is attached hereto as Appendix A 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings In District Court 
In September 2012, an officer observed Bias' vehicle "drifting in its lane, driving 
on top of the white fog line, traveling under the speed limit, and then braking hard when 
approaching a curve in the road." (PSI, p.3.) When stopped by the officer, Bias stated 
"he did not have a driver's license, was 'not sure' about his registration and insurance, 
and didn't know his address." (PSI, p.3.) The officer smelled the odor of alcohol 
coming from the vehicle and "observed a partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey 
and a six pack of mostly consumed Smirnoff mixed alcohol bottles in the back seat." 
(PSI, p.3.) Bias' 17-year-old son was in the vehicle and "admitted to having taken a 
'bug gulp,' of his Dad's whiskey and coke, from the bottle located on the console 
between the front seats." (PSI, pp.3-4.) Bias claimed ownership of the alcohol and 
admitted he had been drinking. (PSI, p.3.) His eyes were "red, glassy and watery" and 
his speech was "slow and lethargic." (PSI, p.3.) He failed field sobriety tests and 
subsequent evidentiary testing showed he had a BAC of .107/.106. (PSI, p.4.) 
The state charged Bias with felony DUI (three or more DUI convictions in 10 
years) and misdemeanor injury to child. (R., pp.36-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
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Bias pied guilty to felony DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charge. (R., pp.45-
46.) The district court accepted Bias' plea and imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, 
with five years fixed. (R., pp.50-52.) Bias timely appealed. (R., pp.55-57.) He also 
filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.) 
Before the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion, Bias filed a prose motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (Augmentation: "Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And 
Supporting Information" (hereinafter "Motion To Withdraw Plea"), filed June 4, 2013.) 
As the basis for his motion, Bias asserted he had entered his plea on the advice of 
counsel and under a good faith belief that counsel had provided him with adequate 
information concerning his defenses. (Motion to Withdraw Plea.) Bias further asserted 
that, "[u]pon further investigation[]," he discovered counsel was aware of, but "neglected 
to pursue possible defenses previous to [his] plea of Guilty" and, according to Bias, 
"said defenses would have provided a substantially different outcome." (Motion to 
Withdraw Plea.) Bias also filed a pro se motion for the appointment of counsel to 
pursue the motion for withdrawal of his plea, asserting therein that the failure of his 
previously appointed counsel to "adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit [had] 
caused the Attorney/Client relationship to become irreparably damaged." 
(Augmentation: "Motion For Appointment Of Counsel And Supporting Information" 
(hereinafter "Motion for Counsel"), filed June 4, 2013.) 
At a hearing on June 24, 2013, the district court took up Bias' Rule 35 motion and 
his pro se motions for the appointment of counsel and withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
(See generally 6/24/13 Tr.) Bias was not present at the hearing, but his previously 
appointed trial counsel argued the Rule 35 motion on Bias' behalf. (6/24/13 Tr., p.16, 
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Ls.7-13, p.17, Ls.8-22.) Counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' prose motions but 
advised the court that he (counsel) had essentially construed those motions as a 
petition for post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7.) The district court agreed 
with counsel's characterization of Bias' pro se motions as reading like a post-conviction 
petition and, ultimately, denied them, reasoning: 
The Defendant is asking for the Court to appoint new counsel for 
him while his case is under appeal, under the circumstances I don't think 
the Court should appoint new counsel at this time. In essence, he's trying 
to get new counsel to handle Rule 35 - excuse me, post-conviction relief. 
Post-conviction relief has a process for the appointment of counsel and if 
postured correctly the Court certainly would consider that request. ... 
But, again, I am going to deny the Motions as filed, but I'm going to 
deny them without prejudice and certainly the Defendant can pursue these 
issues on post-conviction if he wishes to file a Petition that complies with 
the law .... 
But at this time the Court finds that there's no manifest injustice 
alleged except for ineffective assistance of counsel issues. Certainly the 
Defendant isn't arguing that he was innocent. If he was, then the Court 
would take a very different look at this, but the Defendant is basically 
arguing that he disagreed with Defense Counsel's handling of the case 
and that typically is a post-conviction relief matter. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.6 - p.22, L.8; see also Augmentation: "Order Denying All Pending 
Motions" (hereinafter "Order"), filed June 24, 2013.) The court also denied Bias' Rule 
35 motion for reduction of sentence, finding in light of Bias' extensive criminal record 
and history of driving under the influence that "the original sentence imposed in this 
matter was appropriate." (6/24/13 Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.21; see also Order.) 
Course Of Proceedings On Appeal 
On appeal, Bias challenged the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to 
pursue his post-judgment motions. Specifically, he argued, "based on both his 
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constitutional right to counsel and his statutory right to counsel," that (1) the district court 
was required to appoint substitute counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea and motion for reduction of sentence because an actual conflict of 
interest existed between Bias and his previously appointed attorney, and (2) the court 
erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into the basis for Bias' request for 
substitute counsel. 1 (Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12.) 
The Court of Appeals implicitly rejected Bias' claim that he had a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions. See generally 
Opinion, pp.3-8. It held, however, that Bias had a statutory right to counsel under l.C. § 
19-852 and that, to effectuate that right, the district court had a duty, arising out of the 
Sixth Amendment and procedural due process, to inquire into the basis of Bias' request 
for substitute counsel before ruling on the motion. Opinion, pp.3-8. In so holding, the 
Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument - which was based on this Court's 
opinions in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), and Hall v. State, 155 
Idaho 610, 315 P.3d 798 (2013), as well as on the Court of Appeals' prior opinion in 
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) - that the statutory 
"right" to counsel in post-judgment proceedings is not coextensive with the constitutional 
right to counsel and therefore the district court was not required to follow the procedures 
required under the Sixth Amendment to rule on Bias' request for substitute counsel. 
(See Brief of Respondent, pp.10-14.) Instead, relying almost exclusively on cases in 
1 Bias also raised as an issue on appeal whether the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion. (Brief of Appellant, pp.12-14.) Because the Court of Appeals vacated and 
remanded on the substitute counsel issue, it did not reach Bias' excessive sentence 
claim. If this Court grants review, the state relies on its prior briefing for argument on 
the sentencing issue. (See Brief of Respondent, pp.16-20.) 
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which the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals held 
that the district court had a duty of inquiry in this case. Opinion, pp.4-6. 
The Court of Appeals also implicitly rejected the state's argument that, having 
disposed of Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims alleged therein would be better resolved in a collateral 
post-conviction proceeding, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining 
Bias' request for the appointment of counsel to pursue that motion in the post-judgment 
phase of the criminal case. (See Brief of Respondent, pp.14-16.) Instead, the Court of 
Appeals held the district court had an affirmative duty to inquire into the basis of Bias' 
request for substitute counsel, regardless of the court's decision to forego consideration 
of the merits of Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Opinion, pp.4-8. Because, in 
the Court of Appeals' view, the district court "fail[ed] to gather the facts required to 
properly adjudicate the motion for substitute counsel," the Court vacated the district 
court's order denying Bias' motion for substitute counsel and remanded for what the 
Court of Appeals deemed the required inquiry. Id., p.8. Although Bias did not 
specifically challenge the denial of either his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or his 
motion for reduction of sentence, the Court of Appeals nevertheless vacated the orders 
on those motions, as well. "to permit the district court to decide those motions after Bias 
is either appointed new counsel, if required, or offered the opportunity to proceed pro 
se." Id. 
The state filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE ON REVIEW 
Is review appropriate because the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion is contrary to 
both Idaho Supreme Court precedent and prior Court of Appeals' precedent regarding 
the scope of the right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Is Appropriate Because The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Is Contrary To 
Both Idaho Supreme Court Precedent And Prior Court of Appeals' Precedent Regarding 
The Scope Of The Right To Counsel In Post-Conviction Proceedings 
A Introduction 
The district court denied Bias' motion for the appointment of substitute counsel 
to pursue his post-judgment motions for a reduction of sentence and to withdraw his 
guilty plea, concluding the Rule 35 motion was meritless and the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims alleged in the motion to withdraw the guilty plea would be better 
resolved in a collateral proceeding under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA"). (Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 -
p.22, L.8.) The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order based on its 
determinations that Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment 
motions; that the statutory right imposed upon the district court a duty, arising out of the 
Sixth Amendment and procedural due process, to inquire of Bias personally regarding 
the basis of his motion for substitute counsel; and that the district court "fail[ed] to gather 
the facts required to properly adjudicate the motion." Opinion, pp.4-8. The Court of 
Appeals' Opinion is incompatible with both this Court's precedent and prior Court of 
Appeals' precedent regarding the scope of the right to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings. Review by this Court is therefore appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting of review is discretionary. I.AR. 118(b). Factors considered by the 
Court in deciding whether to grant review include "[w]hether the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of substance probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the 
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Idaho Supreme Court," I.AR. 118(b)(2), and "[w]hether the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a previous decision of the Court of Appeals," I.AR. 
118(b)(3). 
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, "this Court gives serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of 
the lower court." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
C. Bias Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Be Represented By Counsel On His 
Post-Judgment Motions For Leniency And To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel 
during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. Estrada v. State, 
143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981)); see also Hall v. 
State, 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013) (citing Idaho Const., art. I, § 13; 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423, n.7 (2009)) ("Idaho law also 
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions."). 
Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not extend to post-
conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007); 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). See also Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 
389, 394, 327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 
(1991 )) ('"[T]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings."'); Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804 ("[T]he right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings is not a constitutional right." (internal quotations and citations 
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omitted)). A post-conviction petition brought pursuant to the UPCPA is a civil 
proceeding and, thus, provides the clearest example of a post-conviction proceeding to 
which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the correlative right to conflict-free 
counsel, do not apply. See Hall, 155 Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804. However, 
collateral proceedings under the UPCPA are not the only post-conviction proceedings 
exempt from the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Unless the proceeding at issue 
constitutes a "critical stage" of a criminal prosecution, a criminal defendant has no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to pursue it. ~. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561-62, 149 P.3d 
at 836-37. 
The determination of whether a particular stage of a criminal prosecution is 
"critical" requires an analysis of '"whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's 
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that 
prejudice."' & at 562, 149 P.3d at 837 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). Conducting 
this analysis in State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 456-58, 235 P.3d 404, 406-08 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (review denied), the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held that a post-
judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment and, as such, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to an 
attorney to pursue such a motion. The Court reasoned: 
[A] post-judgment motion to withdraw [a] guilty plea is far removed from 
the trial process, where the potential for substantial prejudice is great, and 
throughout which the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. 
During such a hearing prior to the entry of judgment, the presence of 
counsel may help avoid prejudice to the defendant should the motion be 
denied. For example, the success of counsel's argument at the pre-
judgment motion has an immediate effect on the defendant's sentence. In 
contrast, unlike at trial, during a line-up, or during motions argued prior to 
sentencing, a judgment of conviction has already been entered before a 
post-judgment hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea takes place. Even 
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if such a motion is denied, the defendant still has available the right to 
appeal his or her conviction or to file an application for post-conviction 
relief. As such, there is less potential for substantial prejudice to a 
defendant's rights. 
kl at 458, 235 P.3d at 408. 
Like a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a post-judgment motion for 
reconsideration of sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is also not a "critical 
stage" of the criminal prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
applies. United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir.1991); but see 
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted) (stating 
in dicta that "[a) criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages of the 
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion" but recognizing counsel can be 
denied under l.C. § 19-852 if motion is frivolous). This is so because a Rule 35 motion 
can "only benefit the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already become 
final"; it is not "a do-over of [the] original sentencing proceeding." United States v. 
Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 2005). There is, therefore, no Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel on a Rule 35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d at 537; United States v. Paloma, 
80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Because Bias had no constitutional right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment 
motions for leniency and to withdraw his guilty plea, his claim on appeal that the district 
court had a duty under the Sixth Amendment to inquire regarding the basis of his 
request for substitute counsel and/or to appoint substitute counsel to pursue those 
motions (see Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12) necessarily fails. 
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D. The Court Of Appeals' Conclusions That l.C. § 19-852 Creates A Statutory Right 
To Counsel In Post-Judgment Proceedings And That Such Right Is Coextensive 
With The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel In The Critical Stages Of A 
Criminal Case Are Contrary To Prior Precedent And Merit Review By This Court 
Idaho Code § 19-852 confers upon indigent criminal defendants the right to be 
represented by counsel "at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when 
a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney 
and including revocation of probation," l.C. § 19-852(2)(a); "[t]o be represented in any 
appeal," l.C. § 19-852(2)(b); and "[t]o be represented in any other post-conviction or 
post-commitment proceeding that the attorney or the indigent person considers 
appropriate, unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is not 
a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at 
his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding," l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) (emphasis 
added). Consistent with the provisions of l.C. § 19-852(2), Bias was represented by the 
county public defender throughout the criminal proceedings, up to and including the 
time of judgment. (See R., pp.23, 27, 33, 39-42, 45-46, 48-49, 53-54; 2/11/13 Tr.; 
3/18/13 Tr.; 6/24/13 Tr.) After he was sentenced Bias, through appointed counsel, filed 
a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.53-54.) He also filed a pro se 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea (Motion to Withdraw Plea) and a motion for the 
appointment of substitute counsel, asserting that his previously appointed attorney 
"failed to adequately argue defenses for [his] benefit," thus "caus[ing] the Attorney/Client 
relationship to become irreparably damaged" (Motion for Counsel, ,-r4). The district 
court denied the motion for substitute counsel, reasoning the Rule 35 motion was 
meritless and Bias' request to withdraw his guilty plea - a request based on allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel - would be more appropriately addressed in a 
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separate action for post-conviction relief. (6/24/13 Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.22, L.8; Order 
Denying Motions.) 
Citing the standards applicable to the right to conflict-free counsel conferred by 
the Sixth Amendment, Bias argued on appeal that the district court, having become 
aware of an "actual conflict of interest" between trial counsel and Bias, was required to 
appoint substitute counsel to assist Bias in pursing his post-judgment motions and was 
also required to inquire of Bias personally regarding the basis of his request. (Brief of 
Appellant, pp.5-12.) Although the Court of Appeals appears to have recognized that 
Bias had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions, 
see Opinion, pp.3-4 (noting Bias' entitlement to counsel arose from l.C. § 19-852), it 
nevertheless held the district court had a duty to inquire of Bias personally regarding the 
basis of his request for substitute counsel based on its determination that Bias had a 
statutory right to counsel to which the procedural framework of the Sixth Amendment 
applied, Opinion, pp.4-8. The Court of Appeals' holding is incompatible with existing 
precedent. 
There is no question that, in cases where a criminal defendant enjoys a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, such right also "include[s] the right to be represented by 
conflict-free counsel." Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Nor is there any question that, in order to 
safeguard the right to conflict-free counsel, "a trial court has an affirmative duty to 
inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably should know that a 
particular conflict may exist." ~ (internal quotations and citations omitted). The trial 
court had no such duty in this case, however, because Bias had no Sixth Amendment 
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right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions; and this Court's precedents make 
clear that Bias' his conditional entitlement to counsel under l.C. § 18-852(2)(c) did not 
confer upon him any statutory right to conflict-free counsel to which the procedural 
protections of the Sixth Amendment would apply. 
In Murphy v. State, supra, this Court analyzed in what circumstances a statutory 
"right" to counsel also carries with it the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel 
and conflict-free counsel. The Court distinguished between statutes that mandate the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel versus those that leave the decision to appoint 
counsel within the district court's discretion. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 
370-71. Citing Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, which "provides for the mandatory 
appointment of counsel for post-conviction review after the imposition of the death 
penalty," the Court noted its recent holding in Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _, 315 
P.3d 798, 804 (2013), "that post-conviction petitioners sentenced to death have the right 
to conflict-free counsel." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 370-71. The Court 
then contrasted Rule 44.2 with l.C. § 19-4904, which leaves the decision to appoint 
post-conviction counsel in a non-capital case within the discretion of the district court. 
JsL at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. Because the appointment of counsel under l.C. § 19-4904 
is discretionary, the Murphy Court observed that that statute does not even "create a 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel," id. (citing Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 
17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000)), much less a right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
non-capital post-conviction proceedings. See !st ("Where there is no right to counsel, 
there can be no deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel."). Thus, the Court 
effectively held that only statutes making the appointment of counsel mandatory confer 
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upon indigent litigants the rights normally associated with the Sixth Amendment, such 
as the rights to the effective assistance of counsel and conflict-free counsel. Compare 
Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995) (right to appointed 
counsel on appeal guaranteed by l.C. § 19-852 includes right to appointed counsel to 
pursue petition for review and therefore Sixth Amendment framework of analysis 
applied to defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel); Smith 
v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34, 203 P.3d 1221, 1232-33 (2009) (statute mandating 
appointment of counsel to challenge designation as a Violent Sexual Predator conferred 
upon indigent petitioner the right to effective assistance of counsel coextensive with the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment). 
Recognizing that a post-conviction petitioner has no constitutional or statutory 
right to counsel, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 
160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (review denied), that the procedures required to rule on 
a request for substitute counsel made by a criminal defendant with a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel do not apply in post-conviction proceedings. The Court reasoned: 
[W]e are not persuaded by Rios-Lopez's reliance on cases addressing the 
procedures necessary to rule on a criminal defendant's request to 
substitute counsel in criminal proceedings. See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 
712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002); State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 
606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 
1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997). Both a criminal defendant and an applicant 
for post-conviction relief may be appointed a substitute counsel if good 
cause is shown for such substitution. See l.C. § 19-856. However, 
determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel for a criminal 
defendant differs from determining whether good cause exists to 
substitute counsel for an applicant for post-conviction relief because the 
underlying rights to counsel differ. A criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to counsel; but, in Idaho, an applicant for post-
conviction relief does not even have a statutory right to counsel. See 
Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902 & n. 1, 908 P.2d at 595 & n. 1. See also l.C. § 
19-4904. Indeed, a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
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counsel may not be brought because the applicant for post-conviction 
relief does not have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See 
Follinus, 127 Idaho at 902-03, 908 P.2d at 595-96. Because Nath, 
Clayton, and Peck address the procedures necessary to protect a criminal 
defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in 
criminal proceedings, those cases are inapposite. 
Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79. 
Like Rios-Lopez, the Court of Appeals in this case relied almost exclusively on 
cases that address "the procedures necessary to protect a criminal defendant's 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings" as the 
basis for its determination that the district court had a duty to inquire before ruling on 
Bias' motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. See Opinion, pp.4-6 (citing, inter 
alia, State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980); State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 
712, 52 P.3d 857 (2002); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 946 P.2d 1351 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 181 P.3d 512 (Ct. App. 2007)). But, as in Rios-Lopez, 
those cases are "inapposite" because Bias had no constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel to pursue his post-judgments and, contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, 
Bias did not "enjoy[] a right to counsel" pursuant to l.C. § 19-852. Opinion, pp.7-8 
(emphasis in original). 
The appointment of counsel to pursue a "post-conviction or post-commitment 
proceeding," other than a probation revocation proceeding or direct appeal in a criminal 
case, is specifically governed by l.C. § 19-852(2)(c). Unlike subsections (2)(a) and 
(2)(b) of l.C. § 19-852, which provide that an indigent defendant is unconditionally 
entitled to be represented by an attorney at all critical stages of a criminal case, 
including an appeal, subsection (2)(c) of the statute permits the denial of appointed 
counsel to pursue a post-judgment motion if "the court in which the proceeding is 
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brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding." In this way, l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) is virtually indistinguishable from l.C. § 19-
4904 - the statute governing the appointment of counsel in collateral post-conviction 
proceedings that this Court noted in Murphy, supra, makes the appointment of counsel 
discretionary with the district court. Because l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) likewise makes the 
appointment of counsel discretionary, and because Bias had no constitutional right to be 
represented by counsel to pursue his post-judgment motions, the procedures mandated 
by the Sixth Amendment to guarantee effective assistance - such as the duty to inquire 
into conflicts of interest - did not apply. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 370-
71; Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343-44, 160 P.3d at 1278-79. The Court of Appeals' 
conclusion to the contrary is incompatible with Murphy and merits review by this Court. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Bias' Motion For The 
Appointment Of Substitute Counsel To Pursue His Post-Judgment Motions On 
The Uncontested Grounds That The Proceedings Were Frivolous And/Or Would 
Be More Appropriately Pursued In A Different Forum 
'"A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a 
showing of good cause."' State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 297 P.3d 244 (2013) (quoting 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009)); see also State v. 
Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012). "Whether substitute 
counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion." Severson, 147 Idaho 
at 702, 215 P.3d at 422 (citing State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 
(2002)). "The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it 
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violated the defendant's right to counsel." kl (citing Nath, 137 Idaho at 715, 52 P.3d at 
860). 
Bias argued on appeal the district court was required to appoint substitute 
counsel to represent him on post-judgment motions for leniency and to withdraw his 
guilty plea because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleged in that 
motion "created an actual conflict of interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in 
seeing those claims denied." (Brief of Appellant, pp.6-7.) Applying a Sixth Amendment 
framework, the Court of Appeals held that, at a minimum, the district court had a duty to 
inquire into the basis of Bias' request for substitute counsel before denying his motion. 
Opinion, pp.4-8. There is no question that, in circumstances where an indigent 
defendant has a right to counsel, an actual conflict of interest constitutes "good cause" 
mandating the appointment of substitute counsel. ~, Lippert, 152 Idaho at _, 276 
P.3d at 759. As discussed above, however, Bias had no constitutional right to counsel 
to pursue his post-judgment motion to withdraw his guilty plea, State v. Hartshorn, 149 
Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404 (Ct. App. 2010), and any statutory entitlement to counsel 
depended on the viability of the motion, see l.C. § 19-852(2)(c) (no entitlement to 
counsel to pursue frivolous post-conviction or post-commitment proceedings). 
The district court, in its discretion, determined that Bias' Rule 35 motion was not 
well-founded and demonstrated no basis for reduction of his sentence. The court also 
determined Bias' motion to withdraw his guilty plea failed to satisfy the "manifest 
injustice" standard of l.C.R. 33, and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
alleged therein would be "more appropriately determined under Idaho's Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act." (Order Denying All Pending Motions; see also 6/24/13 Tr., 
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p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8.) In making these determinations, which Bias has not challenged 
on appeal, the district court effectively ruled that Bias' post-judgment motions were not 
ones a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own 
expense in the criminal proceeding. Because the motions were frivolous, Bias was not 
statutorily entitled to counsel, much less substitute counsel, to pursue the motion. l.C. 
§§ 19-852, 19-856. 
Even assuming Bias had a statutory right to counsel to pursue his post-judgment 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he has failed to show the existence of any "actual 
conflict of interest" that would have mandated the appointment of substitute counsel. 
Trial counsel did not argue the merits of Bias' motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea 
(see 6/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22), and the district court denied the motion 
without prejudice on the basis that the issues presented therein would be more 
appropriately addressed in a separate post-conviction action (see Order Denying 
Motions; 6/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.22, L.8). In so ruling, the district court actually 
avoided any potential conflict that would have arisen had trial counsel been required to 
argue the merits of the motion and litigate his own alleged ineffectiveness. Because 
Bias has not challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea - and, more 
particularly, the court's determination that the claims therein would be better disposed of 
in a separate post-conviction action - he has failed to show any abuse of discretion in 
the denial of his motion for substitute counsel to pursue that motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court grant review and, on review, affirm 
the district court's order denying Bias' motion for substitute counsel to pursue his post-
judgment motions to withdraw his guilty plea and for a reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of January, 2015, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW by causing a copy addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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KIDWELL, Judge Pro Tern 
William Jack Bias was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. After 
he was sentenced, he filed several motions, including a motion for substitute counsel and an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency regarding his sentence. His motions were 
denied and Bias appealed. He argues that the court erred by denying his motion for substitute 
counsel and proceeding to decide his other motions. He also argues that the district court failed 
to adequately consider mitigating factors at sentencing. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Bias was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation 
of Idaho Code § 18-8004 and with misdemeanor injury to a child in violation of LC. § 18-
1501 (3). The State also filed a charging enhancement pursuant to LC. § 18-8005(6), alleging 
1 
that Bias had been previously convicted of three prior DUis. After the public defender was 
appointed to represent him, the injury to a child charge was dismissed and Bias pleaded guilty to 
the DUI charge. After a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified term of ten years with 
five years determinate. 
Nearly a month after the sentence had been pronounced, Bias filed a Rule 35 motion, 
through counsel, seeking leniency on his sentence. Two months later, before the Rule 35 motion 
was adjudicated, Bias filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion for the 
appointment of substitute counsel. Both motions relied upon the assertion that counsel and Bias 
had discussed the case after Bias pleaded guilty. At that time, Bias "questioned [his attorney] 
about an issue [Bias] had brought up previously, and [the attorney's] response was, 'Yeah, we 
could have argued that, before you plead[ed] Guilty."' Bias argued that the poor advice was a 
sufficient basis for the withdrawal of his plea and "caused the Attorney/Client relationship to 
become irreparably damaged" warranting the appointment of substitute counsel. Bias also 
requested an order authorizing transportation from the prison so that he could be present at any 
hearing. 
The court held a hearing on the pending motions. 1 At the hearing, the court denied the 
Rule 35 motion, without prejudice, after reviewing the mitigating and aggravating factors it had 
considered at sentencing. Next, it held that Bias had failed to prove manifest injustice, the 
requirement to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing. Finally, it discussed the motion for 
substitute counsel. In the court's view, Bias was attempting to have counsel appointed for a 
potential post-conviction action before filing a petition and without following the procedures set 
forth by statute. The court asked counsel to inform Bias that these issues would be better raised 
in post-conviction proceedings and that counsel might be available through those proceedings. 
Thereafter, the district court entered a written order denying the pending motions. It 
ruled that the motion for new counsel was "deemed unnecessary, given the appointment of 
appellate counsel."2 It denied the Rule 35 motion because the sentence was 'just and appropriate 
The motion for transport appears to have been implicitly denied as Bias was not present 
at the hearing. 
2 Bias had already filed a notice of appeal intending to challenge his sentence. The district 
court appointed the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender to pursue the appeal. 
2 
under the circumstances," given the defendant's prior criminal record and other factors discussed 
at the sentencing. It denied Bias's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on alternative grounds. 
First, the court held that the motion was not timely. 3 Second, it held that Bias failed to meet his 
burden, a showing of manifest injustice. Finally, it noted that Bias was permitted to pursue these 
claims in post-conviction proceedings. 
Bias filed a timely appeal and contends that the court erred by denying his motion for the 
appointment of counsel for two reasons. First, Bias argues that upon the filing of his motion for 
substitute counsel "a duty is triggered and the district court must afford the defendant the 
opportunity to explain the basis for the request." Because Bias was not present, either in person 
or telephonically, he was denied the right to give that explanation. Second, Bias argues that the 
court should have granted the motion because he had a Sixth Amendment and statutory right to 
counsel for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and representation by an attorney with an 
actual conflict of interest does not satisfy the right to counsel. As a remedy, Bias requests a 
remand with instructions to allow him to have a proper hearing, with new counsel on both the 
Rule 35 motion and the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Bias also argues that the district 
court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties primarily dispute the nature of Bias's right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. In our view, those cases are inapposite. 4 Here, counsel had already been appointed. 
Furthermore, Bias was statutorily entitled to counsel pursuant to LC. § 19-852 unless his motions 
3 Idaho Criminal Rule 33 authorizes post-judgment motions to withdraw a guilty plea. The 
motion was filed June 4, 2013, seventy-eight days after the judgment of conviction was filed on 
March 18, 2013. Because Bias filed a direct appeal, his motion appears to be timely. State v. 
Wegner, 148 Idaho 270, 272, 220 P.3d 1089, 1091 (2009) (holding that absent a statute or rule 
extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal); State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (same). 
4 The right to effective assistance of counsel is critical in post-conviction cases where that 
right is a predicate to certain collateral attacks. Here, Bias is not bringing a collateral attack on 
his conviction. 
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were frivolous. 5 Therefore, even if the State could show that Bias was not entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel, he was entitled to the adjudication of his motion for substitute 
counsel. 
A. The Court's Duty to Inquire 
Both the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court have held that a trial court 
is obligated to apply certain procedures when a person seeks substitute counsel. In State v. 
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P .2d 1000, 1002 (1980), the Court held that "after having been 
made aware by the court of the problems involved" the trial court has an obligation "to afford 
[the] defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of his 
motion for substitution of counsel." 
In State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997), the duty to 
inquire was triggered by the defendant's complaint that he was dissatisfied with counsel and the 
indication that he wanted to "fire counsel." The duty was not mitigated by the fact that the 
defendant was "ill-behaved and disruptive during court proceedings" or because the court 
suspected that the defendant merely sought substitute counsel as a delay tactic. 
The exact scope of the duty to inquire is fact-dependent. Generally, it is not permissible 
to refuse to allow a defendant "to speak on the subject." State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 
P.3d 857, 860 (2002); see also State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 598, 181P.3d512, 524 (Ct. App. 
2007) (J. Lansing dissenting) (the dissent distinguishes an inquiry from cutting the defendant off 
5 The relevant portions ofldaho Code § 19-852 state: 
( 1) An indigent person who is ... being detained under a conviction of, a serious 
crime, is entitled: 
(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having 
his own counsel is so entitled; and 
(2) An indigent person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under 
subsection (I) of this section is entitled: 
(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction or post-commitment 
proceeding that the attorney or the indigent person considers appropriate, 
unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is 
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding. 
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and refusing to let him explain his claim to the court). But, a more limited duty to inquire is 
imposed when a defendant "at best hinted that he was dissatisfied with [his attorney's] 
performance on only one occasion" and took "no initiative to request substitute counsel." State 
v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285, 297 P.3d 244, 248 (2013). Under those facts, it is sufficient to ask 
a defendant if he has any questions, and move on if he fails to raise any complaints about 
counsel. Id. at 285-86; 297 P.3d at 248-49. Finally, where the nature of the issues between 
counsel and client has been set forth, but the record is insufficient to determine whether relief is 
required, the court has a duty to investigate so that there exists a proper basis for a ruling. 
Lippert, 145Idahoat596,181 P.3dat522. 
The defendant's right to an inquiry flows from several interrelated constitutional 
guarantees. The first is the right to effective assistance of counsel, provided at state expense for 
the indigent, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Peck, 130 Idaho at 712-13, 946 P.2d at 
1352-53; see also Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995) ("We can see 
no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by LC. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has 
been a violation of a similar constitutional right."). But the right to an inquiry is not wholly 
dependent upon the right to effective assistance. The right to an inquiry also flows from a 
defendant's constitutional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se. Peck, 130 Idaho at 713-14, 
946 P.2d at 1353-54 ("An accused also has the right to waive court-appointed counsel and to 
conduct his own defense." In that case, remand was required because the defendant "was not 
given a meaningful opportunity to justify his request for substitute counsel or to exercise his 
right to represent himself" (emphasis added)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 
(1975) (holding that the right to self-represent is implicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment). 
Finally, some inquiry may be guaranteed by procedural due process. See Rios-Lopez v. State, 
144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (The post-conviction petitioner did not enjoy 
a constitutionally-protected right to counsel; nonetheless, the court considered whether an 
inquiry was sufficient under general procedural due process principles. Although the right to an 
inquiry cases were not binding precedent, they were discussed as persuasive authority.). 
In this case, we conclude that the district court erred by ruling on the motion for 
substitute counsel before gathering the facts required to adjudicate the motion. In Lippert, the 
defendant asserted that counsel had failed to adequately consult with him. We held that this 
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general averment warranted further investigation and that the district court's failure to "make any 
meaningful determination" warranted a remand. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594, 181 P.3d at 522. 
Conversely, in Rios-Lopez, where the petitioner did not enjoy the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, this Court affirmed the denial of the motion for substitute counsel, decided in the 
petitioner's absence only after concluding that the arguments were "clearly set forth" and that 
"his presence would have added little to the proceedings." Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343, 160 
P.3d at 1278. On balance, we conclude this case is analogous to Lippert. In this case, Bias made 
general averments and the court's failure to develop an adequate factual basis to adjudicate the 
motion limits our review. Accordingly, we must remand to allow the district court to gather the 
facts required to adjudicate this motion. Moreover, should the court conclude that Bias is not 
entitled to substitute counsel, the court should also determine whether Bias wishes to proceed 
prose. 6 
B. Murphy Does Not Control the Disposition of This Case 
The State also argues that Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) has 
changed the law concerning the link between a statutory right to counsel and the guarantee of 
effective counsel. It argues that "the Court effectively held that only statutes making the 
appointment of counsel mandatory confer upon indigent litigants the right, normally associated 
with the Sixth Amendment, to the effective assistance of counsel." (emphasis added). 
In Murphy, the Court first noted that "the United States Supreme Court has held that there 
is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Id. 
at 394, 327 P.3d at 370 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)). It then noted two 
general rules. First, the appointment of counsel in post-conviction actions is discretionary. 
Second, ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is not a "ground for relief." Both holdings 
are entirely consistent with prior law. See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 
1108, 1111 (2004) (discussing the availability of counsel in post-conviction proceedings); Lee v. 
State, 122 Idaho 196, 198, 832 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1992) (explaining that ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel is not a basis upon which a person can collaterally attack a conviction or 
sentence); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03, 908 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(discussing the relationship between ineffective assistance of counsel and the right to a 
6 Because we remand for a consideration of Bias's right to substitute counsel, we need not 
determine whether the court erred by denying Rule 35 relief. 
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"remedy"); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining 
that proper collateral attacks challenge "allegedly improper convictions and sentences" not the 
proceedings in prior post-conviction actions). 
Although Murphy did not change the law regarding the availability of counsel in post-
conviction proceedings, it did change the law concerning I.C. § 19-4908. That provision 
generally bars successive petitions for post-conviction relief, "unless the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application." l.C. § 19-4908. In Murphy, the Court 
concluded that its prior holding, that ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel could 
be a "sufficient reason," was inconsistent with its view that the same ineffectiveness was not 
"ground for relief" and overruled that prior holding. 
We do not believe that the State's argument is relevant to these proceedings. First, as 
stated above, we do not believe that the right to effective assistance of counsel is at issue in this 
case. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court exhibited special concern regarding the effect of 
successive petitions on Idaho's criminal justice system: 
Defendants have made a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted 
imposition of their ultimate penalty with continuous petitions for relief that often 
present claims without a legal foundation. 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371 (quoting Bejarano v. Warden, State Prison, 929 P.2d 
922, 925 (1996)) (emphasis added). Here, there is no possibility of "continuous" petitioning; a 
defendant raising claims in post-judgment motions gets exactly the same process as any other 
criminal defendant--proceedings in the trial court, a direct appeal, and a single collateral attack in 
state courts. Thus, there is little risk that frivolous claims regarding post-judgment motions will 
make a "sham out of the system" by their continuous filings. 
Third, the statutes discussing the availability of counsel are distinguishable. As to a 
petition for post-conviction relief, the appointment of counsel is plainly discretionary. Idaho 
Code § 19-4904 states that "a court-appointed attorney may be made available to the applicant in 
the preparation of the application." (emphasis added). Conversely, a person raising post-
judgment claims in the original criminal action "is entitled . .. [t]o be represented by an attorney 
to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled." LC. § 19-852 (emphasis 
added). The standard is clarified by l.C. § 19-852(2)( c) which explains that the right does not 
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extend to frivolous proceedings. While the court has discretion when adjudicating the standard 
set forth in I.C. § 19-852(2)( c ), the fact remains that the defendant enjoys a right to counsel. See 
Hallv. State, 155 Idaho 610, 616, 315 P.3d 798, 804 (2013) (citing Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 687, 
905 P .2d at 88 for the proposition holding that LC. § 19-852 creates a right to counsel); State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 n.7, 215 P.3d 414, 423 n.7 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-852 for the 
proposition that "Idaho law also guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel"). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the court erred by failing to gather the facts required to properly adjudicate 
the motion for substitute counsel. Accordingly, our ability to review is limited and we must 
remand. Because we remand the motion for substitute counsel, we must also vacate the court's 
decisions on the other motions to permit the district court to decide those motions after Bias is 
either appointed new counsel, if required, or offered the opportunity to proceed pro se. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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